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Abstract: The current economic crisis has hit all European countries hard, but some are more
severely affected than others. The problems manifest in European peripheral countries that are
also members of the Eurozone, that is, Ireland, Spain, and Greece, have roots in domestic policy
mistakes. However, the European context of these policy profiles also needs to be taken into
account. The creation of the Euro initially yielded large credibility gains for the weaker economies,
extending low interest rates across the Eurozone. But it also introduced a set of perverse
incentives toward fiscal expansion which were supposed to be managed at domestic level. Weak
European coordinating capacity meant there were few effective external disciplines on national
decision making. The sanctions built into the Stability and Growth Pact proved more controversial
and, therefore, less constraining than originally envisaged. The problems accumulating in the
weaker economies made them particularly exposed to crisis when the downturn came. The crisis
is not merely one of peripheral economies’ policy errors, but extends to the design of European
decision making and the management of monetary union, and to the underlying structural
differences in relative trade capabilities between Eurozone member states. These issues are
explored with reference to the Irish case: the crisis of the Irish and other peripheral economies
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I
reland experienced one of the most severe economic contractions of the
Eurozone countries, with a dramatic drop in growth and a sudden sharp
increase in unemployment. It shares the experience of crisis with other
European countries, but the trajectory and experience of crisis shows
important variations. Each country experiences the crisis as a challenge to its
domestic capacity to manage its own particular “problem load”; there are
variations in the institutional and political resources each can draw on to deal
with its own issues. 
But in addition to viewing countries’ responses to crisis on a case-by-case
basis, it may be useful to consider the wider political and institutional context
within which domestic responsive capacity is situated. The creation of
European Monetary Union (EMU) has played some part in creating the
conditions for the domestic policy configurations that have intensified the
experience of crisis in many countries. In the early years of EMU, the
availability of a ready source of cheap credit created new growth oppor  -
tunities. But as the economies of the Eurozone were at very different levels of
development, the “one size fits all” central management of the Euro threw
major challenges of domestic adaptation back onto national governments. 
When the crisis began to unfold, national governments were similarly
charged with responsibility for putting their own domestic houses in order.
But once again, there is a European dimension to the management of the crisis
that exposes not only the weaknesses of national decision making systems, but
some systemic weaknesses in the institutional design of the Euro itself.
II  EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES OF CRISIS 
From the perspective of the aftermath of the economic crash, it is now
clear that some European countries were more vulnerable than others to
economic downturn when it did come about. Yet why this should be so became
clear only in retrospect. Although many analysts expected that the growing
deregulation of financial markets since the 1980s and the trend toward
securitisation of financial assets since the 1990s would induce a convergence
in the role of national governments in economic policy, actual outcomes have
been more varied than projected. Nation-states still displayed a good deal of
diversity in the policies they adopted and had considerable room for
manoeuvre (Busch, 2008). The near-collapse of the international financial
system was the proximate cause of crisis. Underlying weaknesses in public
finances were intensified by banking crises. 
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2010 were Belgium and Italy, along with Greece. These countries had long
experienced the greatest political difficulties in controlling expenditure;
qualification for Euro membership had been most problematic for them. But
what presented the most pressing challenge for Eurozone members was the
sudden deterioration in fiscal deficit. Ireland held the unenviable record on
this measure, followed by Greece, Britain, Spain, Portugal, and Iceland. The
concern that emerged during 2009/10 was that problems managing borrowing
requirements would quickly result in greatly increased debt liabilities.
Following the collapse of the Icelandic economy, sunk by the size of the
financial industry and its extreme over-exposure to risk, the weakest links in
the single European currency then seemed to be constituted by Portugal,
Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain, the unappealingly named PIIGS, or perhaps
GIIPS (Dadush, 2010). 
However, the pathways by which countries had arrived at this point were
rather different. On the face of things, the deficit problem is most readily
explicable in the case of Greece, where as Figure 2 shows, fiscal deficits had
persisted throughout the years of Euro membership.
THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT OF IRELAND’S ECONOMIC CRISIS 475
Figure 1: Debt and Deficit as Percentage of GDP, 2010 
Source: General government deficit, general government debt, Eurostat.
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1998-2009
But Ireland and Spain did not run serious deficits during the 1990s, and
indeed Ireland was running a small fiscal surplus during most years leading
up to the crisis (O’Leary, 2010).1 Britain, outside the Eurozone, began to
experience fiscal deficits during the 2000s, especially in the run-up to political
transition from the prime ministership of Tony Blair to his long-anticipated
successor, Chancellor Gordon Brown. But the crash, when it came, placed the
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Spending                   Revenue
Source: Eurostat.
Note: GDP dropped sharply in all four countries between 2007 and 2009, especially in
Ireland, which exaggerates the impact in these graphs of the weaker tax revenues
alongside with continuing spending obligations.
1 “By 1997, the Irish government was running a budget surplus and that outcome was repeated
in all but one of the next ten years. Over the 1997-2007 period the budget surplus averaged 
1.7 per cent of GDP and the debt-GDP ratio fell from 74 per cent to 25 per cent. In the five years
prior to the onset of the current crisis the average budget surplus was somewhat less than this at
1.3 per cent of GDP”... “Finland and Luxembourg also achieved surpluses in 10 out of 11 of these
years, Denmark in nine, Sweden in eight” (O’Leary, 2010, p. 3).
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Greece, Ireland, and Spain. 
Why this should be so has an international as well as a domestic aspect to
it. The international dimension of problematic inter-state relationships within
the single currency area has its origins in the terms on which the Euro itself
was created (Marsh, 2009). Germany’s preference for a strong and
independent bank, based on the Bundesbank model, prevailed over the French
desire to establish some mechanisms of democratic accountability for the
bank’s decision making. The Stability and Growth Pact vested responsibility
for debt and deficit management in national governments. Each member state
acquired new budget-framing and reporting responsibilities to the European
Central Bank. The possibility of unmanageable unilateral fiscal problems was
excluded from consideration on principle, to prevent the possibility of moral
hazard. 
What was created was a multi-level macroeconomic policy. At the centre,
the ECB had quite light regulatory and liquidity responsibilities. And unlike
federal states, the transnational monetary union had no counterpart in fiscal
policy – the total EU budget is estimated at some 1 per cent of the GDP of the
EU as a whole, and programmatic spending on targeted measures such as
agricultural supports and regional cohesion policies accounts for most of this.
The result was analogous to a federal state with a centralised monetary and
exchange rate policy, but effectively no fiscal policy to counter the effects of
regional shocks, and fiscal buffers available at the state level only.
When the Euro introduced a sustained period of low interest rates, this
gave a fillip to the project of integrating the European market in financial
services as well as in freeing up product markets. It was recognised in advance
that the low interest rates that most benefited the largest economies would
not necessarily be optimal across all regions. The principal controls available
to governments to manage these surges in the peripheral economies were
active fiscal policy to counteract spending, and active cost management to
keep down relative cost structures and inflation.
The international context sets the scene for individual countries’
adjustment challenges, in three respects. First, a trade imbalance is inherent
in the diversity of the size of European economies and their level 
of economic development: Germany is the principal exporting economy 
in Europe, but domestic levels of demand had been held under control as part
of the domestic cost-containment strategy, thus reducing the capacity of
smaller countries to export their own goods and services. In Ireland, Spain,
and Greece, “…  current account deficits were mainly driven by private
investment and capital inflows coupled with competitiveness lags” (European
Commission, 2010, p. 215).
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domestic demand meant that bank assets exceeded domestic borrowing
requirements, so German investments flowed outward into the more rapidly
growing economies. This contributed to the greater availability of personal as
well as corporate credit facilities, fuelling the surge in indebtedness in the
peripheral economies. At a more global level, something similar had been
happening in the USA relative to China. China’s sudden emergence as a global
manufacturer gave rise to trade imbalances with the USA; China’s surpluses
were not deployed to raise domestic living standards, but flowed back to the
US in the form of purchase of government bonds and other investments.
Public deficits had their counterpart in a sharp increase in private borrowing
capacity. Across the developed world, the increase in household debt since the
1990s served to raise living standards (or to maintain them in the case of
many US households) and boost demand, in what has been termed a form of
“privatised Keynesianism” (Crouch, 2009). 
Third, low interest rates and expanded availability of personal credit
combined to generate conditions conducive to house-price inflation across
Europe, especially in Ireland and Spain. Cheap credit conditions permitted the
peripheral countries to engage in rapidly rising borrowing, facilitating
domestic credit booms, which were in turn reflected in hugely intensified
construction activity and house price inflation (Conefrey and Fitz  Gerald,
2010). 
These trends were transmitted through western economies by the surge of
growth in the financial sector, as banks found innovative ways to create credit
and sell new financial products. The scale of leveraging involved escalated
sharply, and the market in various forms of hedges and derivates grew so
complex that the level of risk was, in effect, impossible to estimate. All this
was made possible by the spread of support for bank deregulation, especially
in the Anglo-American world (though the Canadian banks had to function
within a tougher regulatory regime, and Australian banks faced “intrusive”
regulation that may have helped forestall over-risky behaviour), and by the
weaknesses of the international monitoring and bank regulation institutions.
The rapid expansion of the financial sector across Europe far outstripped EU
institutional capacities to oversee and regulate it (de la Rosiere, 2009;
Lanchester, 2010). The nature as well as the extent of exposure to risk turned
out to vary significantly across countries, depending on the extent to which
banks bought into asset price bubbles in other countries, or engaged in
intensified lending within their own countries that contributed to domestic
asset bubbles. Icelandic banks suffered the first fate. Irish banks were mostly
exposed to the second kind of risk, a traditional “plain vanilla” kind of over-
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property, but on a scale never before seen (Moghadam and Vinals, 2010;
Regling and Watson, 2010).
Relative cost pressures in the overheated Irish and Spanish economies
during the 2000s had to be managed through fiscal policy and wage-cost
containment. However, the paradoxical effects of the credibility gains these
countries achieved through monetary union had been to soften their budget
constraints. EMU had facilitated pro-cyclical fiscal policies and the
accumulation of deficits; domestic institutional buffers proved inadequate to
resist. The point is not confined to the Euro. Ed Balls, then economic adviser
to British Chancellor Gordon Brown, said of New Labour’s early decision in
1997 to make the Bank of England independent of political influence, that 
“… central bank independence liberated us”. That is, it assured the markets
that Labour would not commit to a high-spending, high-tax strategy. The
govern  ment gained in credibility, which helped keep interest rates low.
Government was freed to increase spending and incur greater deficits without
incurring “normal” retribution from the markets.
III  DOMESTIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC POLICY
Membership of the Euro threw an unprecedented burden onto the
adaptive capacity of the member states in two ways. First, on the demand side,
fiscal policy acquired new significance as the principal means whereby
inflationary pressures could be managed and deficits kept to a minimum,
consistent with the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact. Second, the
institutions of wage bargaining thus also became more important as a
potential means of managing domestic economic performance in the context of
EMU, for unless loss of competitiveness could be managed through relative
cost adjustments internally, the cost would be borne otherwise in the form of
a rise in unemployment. 
National processes through which budgets were approved and policy
priorities established gained a new significance after 2000. As we have noted,
Ireland did succeed in running fiscal surpluses for most of this time, though
this generally came about through over-shoot of revenue projections rather
than as a planned policy. The real problem lay in the fact that most of this
buoyancy was attributable to frothy and cyclical property-related revenue
source. While the overall ratio of tax to GDP changed relatively little, the
composition of taxation changed a good deal, as the emphasis shifted away
from personal income tax and toward taxes on activities to do with property
transactions. 
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EMU, the capacity to run counter-cyclical fiscal policy became an advantage to
the smaller economies that were more vulnerable to fluctuations in the wider
international economic environment. Ireland’s pro-cyclical budgets were
commented on by international monitoring bodies including the ECB, the IMF,
and the OECD, and indeed in 2001 the ECB issued a formal criticism of Irish
fiscal stance. Yet the conclusion of most of the reports was that, in view of the
fiscal surpluses, Irish performance was acceptable (O’Leary, 2010). 
Underlying trends in fiscal policy were problematic. Having adhered to
publicly stated budget disciplines under the coalition government of 1994-
1997, subsequent Fianna Fáil led governments explicitly stopped adopting
constraints on government current spending in the early 2000s, just as the
Euro was coming into being, and just as the boom was gathering pace (Regling
and Watson, 2010). This contributed to the sharp upturn in inflation in 2000
and 2001, as seen in Figure 3 below.
The components of inflation during the 2000s included indirect taxation
feeding through to price increases in goods and services. Southern European
countries also experienced increased inflation, but with lower standard of
living costs, and Ireland’s competitiveness losses were greater. Moreover,
during much of this period the value of the US dollar was weakening, which is
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Figure 3: Irish Consumer Price Index 1996-2009, Annual Percentage Change
Source: Consumer Price Index, Central Statistics Office.
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especially to the US, as Ireland. The loss of export share was therefore painful.
The upturn in Irish shoppers going on weekend trips to New York and Boston
not only dramatised the discretionary income available to many in the Celtic
Tiger era, but more subtly pointed to the incipient hazards of macroeconomic
mismanagement.
Ireland lost control of its cost base, but it was not alone in this. Figure 4
shows the extent of the loss of relative competitiveness, which compares the
countries of the European periphery with the EU average and with German
performance.
Figure 4: Harmonised Competitiveness Indicators, 1999-2010
What this figure captures is the real effective exchange rate obtaining
between the member states of the Euro itself. Ireland and Spain lost
competitiveness most dramatically vis-à-vis their principal European trading
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Note:  For the Euro Area, the real effective exchange rate of the Euro vis-à-vis 21
trading partners is displayed. For Euro Area countries, the table shows the harmonised
competitiveness indicators calculated vis-à-vis the same 21 trading partners plus the
other Euro Area countries. A positive change points to a decrease in price
competitiveness.
Source: Harmonised competitiveness indicators based on GDP deflators, percentage
change, Q4 1998=100. European Central Bank.
new
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Ireland’s was the worst performance by some margin: “… compensation per
employee, which had grown more or less in line with the Euro Area on average
until 1996, increased at two to three times the Euro Area average from 1997
to 2008” (Regling and Watson, 2010, pp. 21-2). Income costs were not the only
contributory factor to competitiveness losses – non-income costs in energy,
transportation, and other business costs were also pushing up costs (O’Farrell,
2010). In contrast, Germany maintained its relative domestic costs quite
steadily over time, in part through geographical diversification of production
across Eastern Europe (Marin, 2010).
One of the principal contributions to the scale of the fiscal collapse during
the crisis was the distortion engineered in the revenue profile during the
2000s. Buoyant revenues hid a dramatic shift in the composition of taxation.
As Figure 5 illustrates, personal income tax declined as a proportion of the
total, while the revenues from the cyclical effects of the construction boom
formed what is now clearly an unsustainably large proportion of the total. 
In addition, governments had come to use tax reliefs very freely indeed to
incentivise behaviour: total reliefs amounted to more than the total income tax
take in 2005, and reliefs ran at three times the European average (Regling and
Watson, 2010, p. 27; Callan et al., 2005). This is consistent with the prevailing
sense that the Irish growth model depended on minimising the direct role of
the state in the economy. Tax expenditures have real behavioural
consequences and may prove to be an expensive policy tool. But they involve
an indirect way of acting that recurs elsewhere: the Irish state typically
prefers to let markets deal with major distributive issues rather than actively
intervening on principles of fairness or redistribution. This is apparent, for
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Figure 5: Composition of Taxation, 1990-2008 
Source: Regling and Watson (2010), p. 27.
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subsidise the accumulation of private benefits in areas such as education,
health care provision, and pensions coverage. Indeed, the same may be noted
of the way in which the eventual rescue of the banks was managed, when
government preferred to create a Special Purchase Vehicle to buy up
distressed assets at a discounted rate, rather than temporary nationalisation
of the banks as happened in the earlier Swedish approach to bank rescue.
Both strategies require the injection of massive amounts of public funding to
recapitalise the banking sector. The political implications of each are clearly
rather different, though their relative technical merits are contested.
Yet spending obligations once incurred cannot easily be reversed. Figure 6
shows the upward trend in government current spending after 2000 (with a
slight corrective after the 2002 elections), that was all too dependent on a
relatively soft revenue base. 
Source: Honohan (2010), Chart 2.9, p. 30.
The policy stance responsible for the weak management of the budget
derives from several sources: we might identify the role of electoral and party-
political considerations, the framework of policy advice, and the wider
incentives and constraints embedded in what we might term the Irish growth
model (Hardiman, 2010a).
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Figure 6: Government Current Expenditure and Revenue, Percentage of GNP, 
1960-2010
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Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats that held power between 1997 and
2007 led Ireland into Euro membership with a distinctive approach to the uses
of public spending. Fianna Fáil Finance Minister Charlie McCreevy, now
notorious for the pro-cyclical motto summarising his approach to budgetary
policy, “When I have it, I spend it”, was also personally as well as politically
close to the leader of the economically liberal Progressive Democrat party,
Mary Harney. This is not unlike the British Labour Party observation noted
above (“central bank independence liberated us”). Politicians, we may say, are
less interested in discipline per se than in the economic and political benefits
attached to the institutionalisation of discipline. The credibility gains won
from Euro membership had very weak institutionalised domestic disciplines to
restrain the surge in pro-cyclical fiscal policy that ensued.
The suspicion of big government and preference for low personal taxation
tilted the Fianna Fáil government toward the right on these issues. Moreover,
the traditionally close relationship between Fianna Fáil and the construction
industry was intensified by an expansion in the tax breaks and incentive
schemes available to the building industry – a useful boost to economic
activity just as US-led FDI began to shrink. Construction employment almost
doubled over a decade to almost 14 per cent of total employment in 2006. The
close relationship between builders, developers, and the Fianna Fáil party
carried on into party funding, although the extent of financial contributions
has been difficult to probe. 
Hallerberg and his colleagues have suggested that coalition governments
tend to negotiate pre-commitment to budget outcomes (a “contract” model of
fiscal policy), whereas single-party governments tend to privilege the decision
making role of finance ministers (a “delegation” model) (Hallerberg et al.,
2009; Hallerberg et al., 2007). The latter conditions are said to be conducive to
budget stabilisation when there is little or no ideological conflict within the
govern  ment, the former when ideological conflict is high. Governments also
vary in the degree to which they were constrained by parliamentary
deliberation to modify their policy proposals and adopt negotiated legislation
(Döring, 2001, 2004; Strøm, 1998). Given the strongly autonomous role
accorded to the Finance Minister in Ireland, and the low levels of ideological
conflict in government, it should have been well suited to adopt strong targets
on both spending and revenue and to make them stick. Yet this did not prove
to be the case. 
It might perhaps have been expected that the autonomous powers of the
Irish Finance Minister would be guided by strong procedural rules and
formalised policy advice. This was not so, however; and international
commentators frequently noted the unusually weak formal rules governing
Irish budgetary procedures. Furthermore, public administration reform had
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world, and the generalist model of recruitment had not been supplemented by
recruitment of specialist professional expertise, especially in the area of
economic competence (Hardiman, 2010c).
The dominant ideas within government and the senior civil service about
what policy mix would be most appropriate were shaped by an acceptance of
the low-tax, export-oriented model (even when not balanced by strong controls
over public spending). The institutionalisation of the low-tax model supported
the ongoing reduction in personal tax liabilities. As financial services grew in
importance relative to GDP, free-market preferences extended also to the
acceptance of a principles-based rather than a rules-based approach to bank
regulation, and the institutional separation of central bank and financial
regulator functions in a “light-touch” regulatory approach. The net effect was
what has been termed a “timid” approach on the part of the financial
regulator, and to what we now know to be a woefully misplaced assumption
that the banks knew best and could be trusted to look after their own
shareholders’ interests (Honohan, 2010).
If government fiscal strategy is one side of the cost management strategy
required within the Eurozone, wage bargaining is the other. Here too we can
see that the domestic institutional configuration was not well suited to taking
on board the full compliance requirements of Eurozone membership.
Government-led tripartite pay deals had expanded greatly from the
agreement that started the series of social partnership agreements under
crisis conditions in the mid to late 1980s. The range of issues had expanded by
the early 2000s. The number of organisations that had some involvement in
the negotiations had greatly increased, since all the civil society bodies that
had previously been given separate forum representation for policy influence
were now part of the National Economic and Social Council (NESC). But the
core deal continued to centre on pay moderation in exchange for increased
personal disposable income through tax cuts, mainly through extending tax
credits rather than taking down rates. 
Three problems with this strategy were not addressed throughout the
1990s. First, it is not clear that the changed policy framework and strategic
priorities required by Eurozone membership really altered the bargaining
priorities embedded in collective bargaining processes. Second, the uneven
coverage of social partnership and the relative weight of the public sector
unions came to be problematic. Third, the extent of competitiveness losses
emanating from inflation-fuelled settlements and rising public sector costs
were not subject to any institutionalised monetary disciplines or constraints. 
The rationale for engaging in rounds of talks leading to a deal at
approximately three-yearly intervals was not only to get a pay deal, but to
situate this in the context of an agreed framework of macroeconomic
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of negotiations. Social partnership was thus legitimated not only by its
internal democratic accountability linkages, but by the notion that public
interest considerations were built into its procedures. Indeed, some were led
to argue that Ireland had evolved a new kind of social learning mechanism, a
deliberative system that not only solved conflicting distributive interests but
permitted an open-ended process of defining what these interests might be
(O’Donnell and O’Reardon, 2002; O’Donnell, 2008, 2001). But it is far from
clear that this was in fact what happened once the objective of securing
Eurozone membership had been attained. Increased industrial conflict broke
out over high inflation, and rising house prices further fuelled union members’
demands for higher wage compensation. The processes of wage determination
through social partnership were not well suited to negotiating internal
deflation, whether through fiscal measures or cost-restraining settlements by
employers and unions. The trade union movement stressed the desirability of
particular kinds of changes to the tax system such as increasing credits to
remove the low-paid from the tax net (though this weakened the income tax
base overall), and extending bands, rather than cutting rates of tax (Irish
Congress of Trade Unions, 2010). But the net effect of the government
commitment to tax reduction resulted in a path-dependent route of sharing
out growth through rising personal incomes rather than through
improvements in public services and other forms of collective consumption,
with all the inequalities this entails between households. As a consequence,
Irish employees quickly came to be among the most lightly taxed in the OECD,
outdone only by Korea and Mexico (OECD, 2009, p.51). The costs of this policy
package did not become apparent until it was too late.
The trade union movement had a rather distinctive profile compared with
other OECD member states though. Because the foreign-owned high-profit
and export-oriented sector tended not to recognise unions at all, union
membership was concentrated in less export-dependent enterprises and in the
public sector. The risks of a union profile such as this for inflation-generating
settlements under conditions of growth have been recognised elsewhere
(Garrett and Way, 1999). Indeed, the fragmented nature of Irish public sector
unions was recognised as a self-reinforcing source of upwardly competitive
wage claims. The principal attempt to address this, through an exercise in
2003 in “benchmarking” public sector salaries, was a contentious exercise.
Many considered this to have been too high a price to settle grievances, and it
was only poorly linked into public sector reform priorities (O’Leary, 2002;
Hardiman and MacCarthaigh, 2011, forthcoming). Relative wage differences
between public and private sectors continued to be a source of disagreement
and conflict (Kelly et al., 2009). 
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inflation that was higher than the EU average and a steady loss of cost-based
competitiveness. The most direct corrective action to Ireland’s over-heating
economy – and Spain’s – would have been an interest rate increase. In the
German model on which the ECB was based, cost containment had been
institutionalised by the interplay between industry-level collective bargaining
and the signalling mechanism of Bundesbank interest rate increases.
Translated to a Eurozone-wide level though, the ECB proved to be most
attentive to the larger economies’ slow growth and their need for a low interest
rate stimulus (Franzese and Hall, 2000; Hall and Franzese, 1998; Crouch,
2002). Thus the actors in collective bargaining processes in fast-growing
economies could not depend on an external monetary policy constraint on their
deliberations. In Ireland, as in Spain and Italy, the Maastricht convergence
criteria had been internalised in to the social partnership procedures (Pérez,
2002). But in an inflationary environment, the social partners had no further
incentive to be self-binding. The Excessive Deficit Procedure was invoked
against Portugal and Germany in 2002, France in 2003, the Netherlands and
Greece in 2004 and Italy in 2005. But the sanctioning consequences of the
Stability and Growth Pact proved weaker in their effects in the cases of
Germany and France, when they in their turn breached the conditions even
more egregiously than Ireland or Portugal (Hallerberg and Bridwell, 2008).
The so-called punishment mechanisms, therefore, became largely ineffective
once EMU was launched (Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, 2008). Moreover,
prominent European leaders began to advocate more flexibility rather than
more discipline, and Romano Prodi called the Stability and Growth Pact
“stupid” (Hallerberg et al., 2009, p.176). The credibility of the sanctions was
called into question for other countries as a result. As the Irish parliamentary
committee on European affairs noted: 
By late 2003 it became clear that their deficits were continuing to rise and that
neither France nor Germany would meet their targets. Neither Member State
faced sanction due to this non compliance. These cases pointed to obvious
credibility and enforcement problems for the SGP. If the two largest Euro Area
economies fail to comply with the rules then why should smaller countries do
so? (Houses of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Affairs, 2010, p.6)
In summary, the fiscal policy regime in Ireland was inappropriate to the
conditions of monetary union. Although a fiscal surplus was often recorded,
this was not a planned part of a counter-cyclical budgetary strategy, for which,
under conditions of rapid growth, a very much larger surplus would have been
appropriate. The underlying weaknesses in what may superficially seem to 
be a stable fiscal situation have recently begun to attract more notice 
THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT OF IRELAND’S ECONOMIC CRISIS 487
04 Hardiman article_ESRI Vol 41-4  14/12/2010  11:18  Page 487(O’Leary, 2010; de la Rosiere, 2009). Thus Ireland, with its extraordinarily
high growth rates between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, should have been
running super-high fiscal surpluses (as Finland was). To the contrary though,
fiscal policy was consistently pro-cyclical, and this was a recurring
phenomenon in Irish public life, where spending booms tend to exacerbate
economic upturns and recession is worsened by the need to address
accumulated deficits (Lane, 1998). Small surpluses implied that the Irish
public finances were highly vulnerable to a return even to moderate or
sustainable rates of growth. There was little capacity for assessing the risk
attached to weakening the revenue base or the capacity to withstand a
downturn of any sort, let alone a major economic crisis on the scale that
actually occurred. The institutional framework both for framing, monitoring,
and implementing fiscal policy had many flaws. Correspondingly, the domestic
institutional framework that was intended to make wage bargaining
consonant with macroeconomic performance also proved to have many
shortcomings, particularly in the foresight capabilities of the main actors. 
But these domestic limitations also need to be placed in the wider context
of European economic governance. The Euro was successful in bringing about
low interest rates and freer cross-border mobility of financial assets. But the
weight of adjustment accorded to national political systems proved to be too
great. Among the perverse and unintended consequences of the Euro was the
fact that an institutional design intended to bring about economic stability by
ending currency volatility ended up by creating incentives for much greater
instability in the form of very uneven growth, asset price inflation, and
unsustainable credit expansion. Ireland, like the other European peripheral
economies, fell victim to the politics of market-led indiscipline. 
IV  RESPONSES TO CRISIS: NATIONAL ADAPTATIONS AND
EUROPEAN COORDINATING CAPACITY
The countries of the European periphery were more exposed than others
to the effects of the financial crisis, and for members of the Eurozone, the
conditions of the governance of the Euro itself made domestic adaptation more
challenging. Similarly, once the economic crisis unfolded from 2008 on, the
varying capacity of countries to devise a successful response has to be
understood against the backdrop of the slow pace of response at the EU level,
and the divided counsel about the most appropriate course of action that has
prevented a coherent and coordinated strategy from being implemented. In
this context, the smaller or weaker member states that had incurred the
largest deficits have had little choice but to start vigorous programmes of
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relative merits of strong budget control measures at the risk of slowing
recovery, or postponing consolidation measures in favour of maintaining a
growth stimulus through continued spending (Alesina and Perotti, 2010;
Giavazzi, 2010; Economics: Free Exchange, 2010). Yet the prospect that this
would indeed stabilise their situation, let alone pave the way for economic
recovery, remained uncertain. Greece continued to experience the greatest
difficulties in 2010; but both Ireland and Spain, having undertaken fiscal
austerity policies, still experienced lower levels of market confidence in their
governments’ bonds, and the prospect of a long period of economic hardship.
The risk of a contagion effect, an unravelling of market confidence in Eurozone
stability spreading from Greece to other countries, came to be a leading
concern. The domestic institutions through which adjustments were managed
first need to be considered; then we shall set these within the wider European
setting. 
We have noted that countries with strong executive autonomy from the
legislature such as Ireland, Greece, and Britain, so far from using this to
enforce a strong fiscal stance, were swayed by market incentives to take the
brakes off and to permit a degree of fiscal laxity that would have been
unconscionable in the preceding decade. (In the case of Britain, the capacity to
allow its currency to depreciate against the Euro helped mitigate the damage
this caused to its cost base, but at the expense of building up larger nominal
deficits over the longer term.) But once the full impact of the crisis hit,
precisely this executive strength could be deployed to impose fiscal stringency,
even when it was electorally unpopular. Figure 7 below outlines an index of
executive discretion, based on measures of the powers available to government
and to committees in parliament in initiating, amending, and securing the
passage of legislation. It shows that there is a broad pattern to the scale of
executive power depending on the growth strategy and model of capitalism in
place. The Anglo-American model, with its strong reliance on market signals,
tends to be relatively unconstrained by obligations to institutionalised
political stakeholders. The Scandinavian model tends toward a more
decentralised and negotiated model of political decision making. Yet within
each category there is also wide diversity, as for example between Greece and
Spain within the “mixed” Mediterranean model of capitalism that features a
strong state role in ownership and control of economic resources.
The strong executive autonomy available to the Irish government had
contributed to creating the problem in the first place; but it also enabled it to
commit successfully to fiscal consolidation once this seemed unavoidable.
Something similar may be said of British governments, where the emergency
budget of the newly formed British Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition
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(Economist, 2010). In the Irish case, the commitment to a strong programme
of spending cuts came relatively early, in a succession of budgets during 2008
and 2009, and most dramatically in a further sharp unilateral cut to public
sector pay in Budget 2010 in December 2009. Both Spain and Greece
implemented painful cuts and tax increases on a scale that has nowhere been
apparent elsewhere in Europe.
Governments’ capacity to gain acceptance of austerity measures from
organised economic interests may also make a difference to the viability of
their stabilisation strategy. In mid-2010, the Irish trade union movement
voted to accept a deal that offered assurances that there would be no further
pay cuts, in return for active implementation of public sector reform measures,
the “Croke Park Agreement”. This acceptance of a form of “concession
bargaining” in the intensive though ultimately abortive pay talks leading up
to the unilaterally imposed December 2009 budget; some basis for agreement
between government and unions (though not now employers) had been
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Figure 7: Index of Executive Autonomy and Varieties of Capitalism
















Note: The data in the first column is derived from Döring 2001. Table 1 in that work
itemised executive-enhancing legislative rules; we have allocated a sum of pluses and
minuses to provide a single score. Table 2 itemised committee-strengthening parlia  -
mentary rules; a single score was similarly derived from this. The total from Table 2
was subtracted from Table 1 to give an index of executive dominance.
Sources: Döring (2001); Hall and Soskice (2001); Molina and Rhodes (2007); Pontusson
(2005).
04 Hardiman article_ESRI Vol 41-4  14/12/2010  11:18  Page 490reached which could be reactivated at this point. In Britain, the issues under
discussion in the run-up to the election of May 2010 were about the timing and
incidence of budget cuts, not the principle; and British trade unions are
organisationally too weak either to organise resistance or to need to be
involved as policy interlocutors (Merkel et al., 2007; Hardiman, 2010b). In
contrast, Spain and Greece have stronger and more contested left-right
divisions in their party systems. Yet the differences between these two
countries are striking too, notwithstanding street protests in both countries at
austerity measures during 2010. Spain has a more strongly developed
tradition of forming social pacts and more strongly institutionalised
mechanisms for resolving political contestation. But Greece has been
characterised as “une société bloquée”, in which the principal method for
managing internal conflicts is through allocation of selective benefits (or
clientelism), and in which lower levels of political institution-building mean
that the communist Left can gain more traction through popular mobilisation
than in other countries (Ongaro, 2010; Antoniades, 2010; Featherstone, 2005). 
The domestic institutional configuration of these countries helps to
explain the variations in the profile of their responses to crisis. But once again,
domestic institutional and political capacity is not the whole story, and the
situation of each country in the international context, and the nature of its
exposure to cross-national pressures, is also a critical part of the story. As of
mid-2010 the trajectory of crisis is still unfolding, but the interplay between
individual country responses and the coordination of response at the EU level
brought out three key features of the governance of the Eurozone. The nature
of Ireland’s response can only be fully analysed once these background
conditions are filled in. All three conditions have to do with the weaknesses in
the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact from an early stage, and
for the failure to make any provision for the possibility of longer-term inability
to comply on account of serious domestic fiscal crisis (Heipertz and Verdun,
2010; Dyson, 2008). First, the obligation to undertake policy adjustment
exclusively at national level risked pushing the issue to the brink of the
prospect of sovereign debt default. Second, once this prospect became
conceivable, the coordinating capacity of the EU was revealed to be subject to
fragmentation along lines of nationality. Third, the dearth of ideas about
Europe-level macroeconomic priorities and growth strategy became evident.
The orthodox view that rapid consolidation is desirable to secure a return to
growth gained ground among the larger member states, including Germany,
while a number of commentators pointed to the risk that this would further
depress the prospects of recovery under conditions of a gravely impaired
financial sector, no possibility of currency devaluation, and continuing
structural trade imbalances. 
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manage fiscal adjustments entirely within their own resources, the risk
associated with sovereign debt on the international bond markets suddenly
became much more differentiated, as Figure 8 illustrates. 
Figure 8: Interest Rates on Ten-Year Government Bonds
Because the possibility of fiscal crisis and the risk of sovereign debt default
had been ruled out of account at the outset, there was no straightforward
means of providing a credit line to the countries under greatest pressure –
specifically to Greece, whose fiscal imbalances dated back some time. It took
until late spring 2010 to provide supports in the form of a credit line to Greece
from Eurozone member states, organised through the ECB. Alongside IMF
intervention, this eventually stabilised Greece’s short to medium-term
borrowing problems.
It remained unclear what the appropriate forum would be within which
political mechanisms to prevent speculative attacks on individual countries
could be worked out. The short-term issue centred on the urgency of a “Greek
bail-out”, a difficult issue for German politicians facing important regional
elections in May 2010. A combination of access to ECB loans on terms that
were quickly drafted, and recourse to IMF loan facilities, defused the
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only of immediate painful fiscal austerity but also of reform of social
programme design and tax administration reform, intended to provide
assurances that the medium to longer term fiscal trajectory would be stronger.
But the scale of the fiscal problems it faced was clearly immense, and
increasingly opening up the possibility of sovereign debt default. This in turn
exposed the extent to which the peripheral countries’ problems were in fact
Europe-wide problems. French and German banks held much of the Greek
government debts. The German financial regulator in 2009 produced a worst-
case scenario of up to €800 billion in bad debts (Eurointelligence, 2010). Stress
testing of European banks in mid-2010 allayed the worst of these fears (Balzi
et al., 2010). But the guarantees extended by governments across Europe to
their banks meant that large volumes of private debt risked becoming a public
debt liability. The issue for the Eurozone during 2010 slowly changed colour
from a problem of sovereign debt in one country, Greece, to the risk of a
contagion effect as nervousness spread, especially as it touched the much
larger Spanish economy. Banking crises and fiscal crises had to be dealt with
separately, but they were related problems. 
European countries also faced a continuing problem about how best to
create the conditions for the resumption of growth. The European periphery,
particularly Ireland and Greece, but also Spain and Portugal, had very little
choice in this: unless their governments embarked on austerity programmes,
they would be unable to continue to raise the borrowing they needed to
conduct their affairs. But these countries risked finding themselves in a
double bind: having embarked on austerity measures, the growth potential
would now be lower, the capacity to service debt correspondingly reduced,
resulting in higher not lower interest rates. In the longer term, it is clear that
market investors value growth and sustainable employment levels as much as
fiscal orthodoxy. 
Anticipatory austerity to appease the markets risked intensifying the
negative European spiral, and a number of commentators warned of the risk
of “double-dip recession” (Almunia et al., 2009; Marzinotto et al., 2010;
Dadush, 2010; Wells and Krugman, 2010; Wolf, 2010). O’Rourke and others
argued that in countries that had some leeway to create a stimulus, active
demand-inducing measures would be preferable to a collective Europe-wide
adoption of austerity policies (O’Rourke, 2010). If all were to engage in
competitive internal devaluations by accepting domestic hardships, a “beggar
my neighbour” effect could ensue, such that no country could provide the
demand stimulus for the now increasingly competitive exports of the others.
Yet the trend toward adopting orthodox austerity policies seemed widespread,
extending to Germany and receiving the endorsement of the G20 in mid-2010
(Alesina and Perotti, 2010). 
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the preferences of the ECB and different members of the European
Commission over what should be done, revealed the difficulties of complex
coordination in European economic governance. Three possible future lines of
development may be outlined. The first would suggest that nothing short of a
large-scale coordinated political re-engineering of the European political
system itself was required. Hallerberg et al., argued that “… it is important to
centralise the budget process” (Hallerberg et al., 2009). In fact at national
level, a number of countries with centralised budgetary procedures also ended
up in fiscal trouble, suggesting that fiscal disciplines are not only due to
centralisation, but to some combination of monetary, fiscal and financial
policies. Further centralising the European budget process at trans-national
level would require a massive increase in centralised political competences.
One commentator stated the prospect as follows: “… the Eurozone will need to
commit itself to a full-blown fiscal union and proper political institutions that
give binding macroeconomic instructions to member states for budgetary
policy, financial policy and structural policies. The public and private sector
imbalances are so immense that they are not self-correcting”. In this view,
European citizens face a stark choice, between “… reverting to dysfunctional
and, as it transpires, insolvent nation states, or jumping to a political and
economic union” (Münchau, 2010). However, this view suffers from political
implausibility. European voters would be unlikely to approve increased
transfers of powers to a federal centre; there is a marked lack of appetite
among European leaders for any new constitutional initiatives; and the
German Constitutional Court has ruled that any further moves in this
direction would be impermissible under their existing constitution.
Furthermore, as Rodrik argues, it is far from clear that it is even possible, let
alone accepted as legitimate, to “domesticate” national polities and societies by
delegating powers to supranational institutions (Rodrik, 2007a and b). In the
absence of a common working language, Europe-wide representative parties,
and discursive capabilities that transcend national borders, it is difficult to see
how any such legitimation could be achieved (McKay, 1999).
The second possibility would require European leaders and the ECB to
shift the terms of the debate about EMU. The conventional position about the
Euro is that no country can countenance sovereign debt default because this
would undermine the viability of the single currency, and would even require
the defaulting country to exit the single currency, with disruptive
consequences all round. But the case could be made that a government
defaulting on its debt need have no consequences for the currency regime at
all: “… in the event of a Greek government default, the system could assure
the stability of the Greek financial sector, and concern itself with any bank
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difficulties”, where “… its taxpayers and the creditors will bear the conse  -
quences” (Melitz, 2010). This would require reforms to provide the ECB with
stronger supervisory powers over banks in the Eurozone, and power to act as
lender of last resort. It would detach financial stability from fiscal stability,
and avoid the moral hazard involved in underwriting bail-outs (however
condition-bound). But while this position may be economically sound, since the
argument that fiscal rectitude is required to guarantee the value of the
currency may not be very strong, it is may be politically difficult to adhere to.
Sovereign defaults are historically quite common, as Reinhart and Rogoff have
documented, but they are painful for countries that have to endure their
effects (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). “No bail-out” may still be an inviolable
principle within the Eurozone. But there are also powerful underlying
normative assumptions that the EU stands for more than a free market area;
that inequality of living standards is a concern; and even that social stability
itself may be threatened by extreme fiscal crises and that tolerating this would
be inconsistent with the EU’s self-professed values. 
The third outcome is perhaps the most realistic and the most probable,
and would involve more of the institutional bricolage through which
institution-building within the EU has commonly taken place, with no grand
design but rather multiple adjustments and fixes. This could happen alongside
intensified bank supervision on the part of the ECB, and increased powers of
scrutiny and even oversight of national budgets by the European Commission,
as recommended in the first phase of the work of the Task Force on European
Governance chaired by President of the European Council Hermann von
Rompuy, (Van Rompuy, 2010). Divergent preferences would be inevitable,
especially between French and German leaders, over the redesign of the
sanctioning powers of the Stability and Growth Pact; but these kinds of
tensions are, after all, also a familiar aspect of European politics. 
V CONCLUSION
The domestic origins of countries’ experiences of economic crisis have to be
taken seriously: Ireland was over-exposed to risk on a variety of fronts and
suffered a correspondingly severe response to the international crisis when it
came. The taxation system had been systematically weakened over time;
political decision making was not firmly grounded in adequate risk
assessment, whether of the stability of the financial system or the
sustainability of fiscal policy; a massive asset price bubble was allowed to
accumulate. As a small and very open economy committed to a strongly
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economic downturn. But governments also failed to plan for this contingency
through active counter-cyclical budget management, and the design of
banking sector regulation proved woefully inadequate. A low-tax discourse is
embedded in the political system, and even the Labour Party and the Greens
in Ireland find it difficult to make the case for rational and egalitarian tax
reform, consistent with the need to keep productive assets priced low and
encourage efficient use of scarce resources. 
But in addition to these factors, it is useful also to recognise that there is
an international dimension to Ireland’s policy errors of the past decade. The
politics of cheap money which lay behind the crisis depended on untested
assumptions about nation-states’ capacity to manage a policy mix consistent
with ECB requirements. The under-institutionalisation of the nominal policy
constraints at European level imposed the need for heroic levels of self-
restraint on the part of peripheral economies. The new politics of the Euro,
which was meant to constrain domestic policy, in fact ended up softening
budget constraints: the ties did not bind (Hallerberg and Bridwell, 2008). 
Similarly, there is a European dimension to the strategies adopted in
response to crisis. Ireland adopted austerity policies relatively early, though
the scale of the adjustment required grew even as the measures were being
implemented. The policy community had no real experience of financial sector
crisis, but had recent experience of fiscal crisis. Even if the precise policy mix
of spending cuts and tax increases is contested, the belief that fiscal
consolidation was evitable and would be effective remained widely shared, at
least during 2008-2010. In the short to medium term, Ireland’s policy options
were tightly constrained. But in the medium to longer term, the conviction
that this would restore Ireland’s competitiveness conditions, and therefore
growth prospects, depended on rescue coming from the international economy,
as it had in the late 1980s. This remained far from clear in the context of a
Europe-wide persistence with the politics of austerity (Krugman, 2010). The
disagreements emerging between key European leaders were reminiscent of
older divisions between “economists” and “monetarists” (Marsh, 2009, pp. 38-
41), that is, between those who believed that currency unions are only possible
when deep economic structures are fully aligned, and those who held that
monetary union itself is an effective driver toward convergence in economic
performance.
In summary therefore, Ireland has made many policy mistakes and is
paying a high price for correcting them. The corrections are painful yet
unavoidable. But the real dynamic for floating the Irish economy off the rocks
of recession lies outside its control. The future for Irish growth prospects
remains deeply tied into the terms of European debate. 
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